Abstract. In this paper, we propose a ternary knowing how operator to express that the agent knows how to achieve ϕ given ψ while maintaining χ in-between. It generalizes the logic of goal-directed knowing how proposed by Wang in [10] . We give a sound and complete axiomatization of this logic.
Introduction
Standard epistemic logic proposed by von Wright and Hintikka studies propositional knowledge expressed by "knowing that ϕ" [9, 6] . However, there are very natural knowledge expressions beyond "knowing that", such as "knowing what your password is", "knowing why he came late", "knowing how to go to Beijing", and so on. In recent years, there have been attempts to capture the logic of such different kinds of knowledge expressions by taking the "knowing X" as a single modality [13, 14, 2, 3, 5, 10] . 3 In particular, Wang proposed a logical language of goal-directed knowing how [10] , which includes formulas Kh(ψ, ϕ) to express that the agent knows how to achieve ϕ given the precondition ψ. 4 The models are labeled transition systems which represent the agent's abilities, inspired by [11] . Borrowing the idea from conformant planning in AI (cf. e.g., [8, 15] ), Kh(ψ, ϕ) holds globally in a labeled transition system, if there is an uniform plan such that from all the ψ-states this plan can always be successfully executed to reach some ϕ-states. As an example, in the following model Kh(p, q) holds, since there is a plan ru which can always work to reach a q-state from any p-state. In [10] , a sound and complete proof system is given, featuring a crucial axiom capturing the compositionality of plans:
However, as observed in [7] , constraints on how we achieve the goal often matter. For example, the ways for me to go to New York are constrained by the money I have; we want to know how to win the game by playing fairly; people want to know how to be rich without breaking the law. Generally speaking, actions have costs, both financially and morally, we need to stay within our "budget" in reaching our goals. Clearly such intermediate constraints cannot be expressed by Kh(ψ, ϕ) since it only cares about the starting and ending states. This motivates us to introduce a ternary modality Kh(ψ, χ, ϕ) where χ constrains the intermediate states. 5 In the rest of the paper, we first introduce the language, semantics, and a proof system of our logic in Section 2. In Section 3 we give the highly non-trivial completeness proof of our system, which is much more complicated than the one for the standard knowing how logic. In the last section we conclude with future directions.
The Logic
Definition 1 (Language). Given a set of proposition letters P, the language L Khm is defined as follows:
where p ∈ P. Khm(ψ, χ, ϕ) expresses that the agent knows how to guarantee ϕ given ψ while maintaining χ in-between (excluding the start and the end). Note that Khm(ψ ∧ χ, χ, ϕ ∧ χ) expresses knowing how with inclusive intermediate constraints. We use the standard abbreviations ⊥, ϕ ∨ ψ and ϕ → ψ, and define Uϕ as Khm(¬ϕ, ⊤, ⊥). U is intended to be an universal modality, and it will become more clear after defining the semantics. Note that the binary know-how operator in [11] can be defined as Kh(ψ, ϕ) := Khm(ψ, ⊤, ϕ).
Definition 2 (Model). Given a countable set of proposition letters P and a countable non-empty set of action symbols Σ. A model (also called an ability map) is essentially a labelled transition system (S, R, V) where:
-S is a non-empty set of states;
S×S is a collection of transitions labelled by actions in Σ;
We write s a − → t if (s, t) ∈ R(a). For a sequence σ = a 1 . . . a n ∈ Σ * , we write s
Note that σ can be the empty sequence ǫ (when n = 0), and we set s ǫ − → s for any s. Let σ k be the initial segment of σ up to a k for k ≤ |σ|. In particular let σ 0 = ǫ. We say σ = a 1 · · · a n is strongly executable at s ′ if for each 0 ≤ k < n: s
Intuitively, σ is strongly executable at s if you can always successfully finish the whole σ after executing any initial segment of σ from s. For example, ab is not strongly executable at s 1 in the model below, though it is executable at s 1 . 
Definition 3 (Semantics
where we say σ = a 1 · · · a n is strongly χ-executable at s
-σ is strongly executable at s ′ , and -s
It is obvious that ǫ is strongly χ-executable at each state s for each formula χ. Note that Khm(ψ, ⊥, ϕ) expresses that there is σ ∈ Σ ∪ {ǫ} such that the agent knows doing σ on ψ-states can guarantee ϕ, namely the witness plan σ is at most one-step. As an example, Kh(p, ⊥, o) and Kh(p, o, q) hold in the following model for the witness plans a and ab respectively. Note that the truth value of Kh(ψ, χ, ϕ) does not depend on the designated state.
Now we can also check that the operator U defined by Khm(¬ψ, ⊤, ⊥) is indeed an universal modality:
The following formulas are valid on all models.
PROOF Assuming that M, s U(p → q), it means that M, t p → q for all t ∈ S. Given M, t p, it follows that M, t q. Thus, we have ǫ is strongly ⊥-executable at t. Therefore, we have M, s Khm(p, ⊥, q). 
, it follows that σ ∈ Σ ∪ {ǫ}. Thus, σ = a 1 · · · a n where n ≥ 2. Let u be a state such that M, u p. Since σ = a 1 · · · a n is strongly oexecutable at u, it follows that a 1 is executable at u. Moreover, since n ≥ 2, we have M, v o for each v with u a1 − → v. Therefore, we have M, s Khm(p, ⊥, o).
, it follows that there exists σ ∈ Σ * such that for each M, u p: σ is strongly o-executable at u and M, v q for each v with u Table 1 constitutes the proof system SKHM.
Definition 4 (Deductive System SKHM). The axioms and rules shown in
Note that DISTU, NECU, TU are standard for the universal modality U. 4KhmU and 4KhmU are introspection axioms reflecting that Khm formulas are global. EMPKhm captures the interaction between U and Khm via empty plan. COMPKhm is the new composition axiom for Khm. UKhm shows how we can weaken the knowing how claims. ONEKhm is the characteristic axiom for SKHM compared to the system for binary Kh, and it expresses the condition for the necessity of the intermediate steps.
Axioms TAUT all tautologies of propositional logic Table 1 . System SKHM Remark 1. Note that the corresponding axioms for COMPKhm, EMPKhm and UKhm in the setting of binary Kh are the following:
In the system SKH of [10] UKh can be derived using COMPKh and EMPKh. However, UKhm cannot be derived using COMPKhm and EMPKhm. In particular,
Since U is an universal modality, DISTU and TU are obviously valid. Due to the fact that the modality Khm is not local, it is easy to show that 4KhmU and 5KhmU are valid. Moreover, by Propositions 1-4, we have that all axioms are valid. Due to a standard argument in modal logic, we know that the rules MP, NECU and SUB preserve formula's validity. The soundness of SKHM follows immediately.
Theorem 1. SKHM is sound w.r.t. the class of all models.
Below we derive some theorems and rules that are useful in the later proofs.
Proposition 5. We can derive the following in SKHM:
where χ ′ is obtained by replacing some occurrences of ϕ in χ by ψ.
PROOF REU is immediate given DISTU and NECU. 4U and 5U are special cases of 4KhmU and 5KhmU respectively. ULKhm, UMKhm, URKhm are the special cases of UKhm.
To prove UNIV, first note that U¬p ↔ U(p → ⊥) due to REU. Then due to EMPKhm, we have U¬p → Khm(p, ⊥, ⊥). RE can be obtained by using UKhm and NECU.
Completeness
This section will prove that SKHM is complete w.r.t. the class of all models. The key is to build a canonical model based on a fixed maximal consistent set, just as in [10] . However, the canonical model here is much more complicated. Firstly, the state of the canonical model is a pair consisting of a maximal consistent set and a marker which will play an important role in defining the witness plan for Khm-formulas. Secondly, different from the canonical model in [10] where each formula of the form Kh(ψ, ϕ) is realized by an one-step witness plan, some Khm(ψ, χ, ϕ) formulas here have to be realized by a two-step witness plan, and the intermediate states need to satisfy χ.
Here are some notions before we prove the completeness. Given a set of L Khm formulas ∆, let ∆| Khm and ∆| ¬Khm be the collections of its positive and negative Khm formulas:
In the following, let Γ be a maximal consistent set (MCS) of L Khm formulas. We first prepare ourselves with some handy propositions. Since every ∆ ∈ Φ Γ is maximal consistent it follows immediately that: χ 1 , ϕ 1 
By DISTU we have:
Since Khm (ψ 1 , χ 1 , ϕ 1 ) , . . . , Khm(ψ k , χ k , ϕ k ) ∈ Γ , we have UKhm (ψ 1 , χ 1 , ϕ 1 ) , . . . , UKhm(ψ k , χ k , ϕ k ) ∈ Γ due to 4KhmU and the fact that Γ is a maximal consistent set. Similarly, we have U¬Khm(ψ
. By DISTU and NECU, it is easy to show that ⊢ U(p∧q) ↔ Up∧Uq. Then due to a slight generalization, we have:
Now it is immediate that Uϕ ∈ Γ . Due to Proposition 6, Uϕ ∈ ∆ for all ∆ ∈ Φ Γ .
Proposition 8. Given
PROOF Assuming Khm(ψ, ⊤, ϕ) ∈ Γ and ψ ∈ ∆ ∈ Φ Γ , if there does not exist
It follows by Proposition 7 that U¬ϕ ∈ Γ , namely Khm(ϕ, ⊤, ⊥) ∈ Γ . Since U(ϕ → ⊥) and Khm(ψ, ⊤, ϕ) ∈ Γ , it follows by COMPKhm that Khm(ψ, ⊤, ⊥) ∈ Γ namely, U¬ψ ∈ Γ . By Proposition 6, we have that U¬ψ ∈ ∆. It follows by TU that ¬ψ ∈ ∆. This is contradictory with ψ ∈ ∆. Therefore, there exists ∆ ′ ∈ Φ Γ such that ϕ ∈ ∆ ′ .
Definition 6. Let the set of action symbols Σ Γ be defined as
The later part of Σ Γ is to handle the cases where the intermediate state is indeed necessary: ¬Khm(ψ, ⊥, ϕ) makes sure that you cannot have a plan to guarantee ϕ in less than two steps.
In the following we build a separate canonical model for each MCS Γ , for it is not possible to satisfy all of Khm formulas simultaneously in a single model since they are global. Because the later proofs are quite technical, it is very important to first understand the ideas behind the canonical model construction. Note that to satisfy a Khm(ψ, χ, ϕ) formula, there are two cases to be considered:
(1) Khm(ψ, ⊥, ϕ) holds and we just need an one-step witness plan, which can be handled similarly using the techniques developed in [10] ;
(2) Khm(ψ, ⊥, ϕ) does not hold, and we need to have a witness plan which at least involves an intermediate χ-stage. By ONEKhm, Khm(ψ, ⊥, χ) holds. It is then tempting to reduce Khm(ψ, χ, ϕ) to Khm(ψ, ⊥, χ) ∧ Khm(χ, χ, ϕ). However, it is not correct since we may not have a strongly χ-executable plan to make sure ϕ from any χ-state. Note that Khm(ψ, χ, ϕ) and Khm(ψ, ⊥, χ) only make sure we can start from certain χ-states that result from the witness plan for Khm(ψ, ⊥, χ). However, we cannot refer to such χ-states in the language of L Khm . This is why we include χ ψ markers in the building blocks of the canonical model besides maximal consistent set. χ ψ roughly tells us where does this state "comes from". 
, and χ ψ , ϕ ∈ Σ Γ for some ϕ or ψ, ⊥, χ ∈ Σ Γ }. We write the pair in S as w, v, · · · , and refer to the first entry of w ∈ S as L(w), to the second entry as R(w);
For each w ∈ S, we also call w a ψ-state if ψ ∈ L(w).
In the above definition, R(w) marks the use of w as an intermediate state. The same maximal consistent set ∆ may have different uses depending on different R(w). We will make use of the transitions w ψ,⊥,χ
The highly non-trivial part of the later proof of the truth lemma is to show adding such transitions and making them to be composed arbitrarily will not cause some Khm(ψ, χ, ϕ) ∈ L(w) to hold at w.
We first show that each ∆ ∈ Φ Γ appears as L(w) for some w ∈ S c .
Proposition 9.
For each ∆ ∈ Φ Γ , there exists w ∈ S c such that L(w) = ∆.
PROOF Since ⊢ ⊤ → ⊤, it follows by NECU that ⊢ U(⊤ → ⊤). Thus, we have U(⊤ → ⊤) ∈ Γ . It follows by EMPKhm that Khm(⊤, ⊥, ⊤) ∈ Γ . It follows that a = ⊤, ⊥, ⊤ ∈ Σ Γ . Since ⊤ ∈ ∆, it follows that (∆, ⊤ ⊤ ) ∈ S c . Since Γ ∈ Φ Γ , it follows by Proposition 9 that S c = ∅.
Proposition 7 helps us to prove the following two handy propositions which will play crucial roles in the completeness proof. Note that according to Proposition 7, to obtain that Uϕ in all the ∆ ∈ Φ Γ , we just need to show that ϕ is in all the ∆ ∈ Φ Γ , not necessarily in all the w ∈ S c .
Proposition 10. Given
PROOF Suppose that every ψ-state has an outgoing a-transition, then by the definition of R c , ψ ′ is in all the ψ-states. For each ∆ ∈ Φ Γ , either ψ ∈ ∆, or ψ ∈ ∆ thus ψ ′ ∈ ∆. Now by the fact that ∆ is maximally consistent it is not hard to show ψ → ψ ′ ∈ ∆ in both cases. By Proposition 7,
PROOF Firstly, we focus on the case of a = ψ, ⊥,
. Therefore, we have ϕ ∈ ∆ for each ∆ ∈ Φ Γ with ϕ ′ ∈ ∆, namely ϕ ′ → ϕ ∈ ∆ for all ∆ ∈ Φ Γ . It follows by Proposition 7 that U(ϕ ′ → ϕ) ∈ Γ . Secondly, we focus on the case of a = χ ψ , ϕ ′ . For each ∆ ∈ Φ Γ with ϕ ′ ∈ ∆, it follows by Proposition 9 that there exists v ∈ S c such that L(v) = ∆. Since a is executable at w, it follows that w
. Therefore, we have shown that ϕ ′ ∈ ∆ implies ϕ ∈ ∆ for all ∆ ∈ Φ Γ . It follows by Proposition 7 that U(ϕ ′ → ϕ) ∈ Γ . Before proving the truth lemma, we first need a handy result.
Proposition 12. Given a non-empty sequence
-σ is strongly executable at w;
PROOF If there is no ψ-state in S c , it follows that ¬ψ ∈ L(w ′ ) for each w ′ ∈ S c . It follows by Proposition 9 that ¬ψ ∈ ∆ for all ∆ ∈ Φ Γ . By Proposition 7, we have U¬ψ ∈ Γ . By UNIV, Khm(ψ, ⊥, ⊥) ∈ Γ . Since ⊢ ⊥ → χ and ⊢ ⊥ → ϕ.
Then by NECU, we have ⊢ U(⊥ → χ) and ⊢ U(⊥ → ϕ). By UMKhm and URKhm, it is obvious that Khm(ψ, χ, ϕ) ∈ Γ .
Next, assuming v ∈ S c is a ψ-state, we will show Khm(ψ, χ, ϕ) ∈ Γ . There are two cases: n = 1 or n ≥ 2. For the case of n = 1, we will prove it directly; for the case of n ≥ 2, we will prove it by induction on i.
-n = 1. If a 1 is in the form of χ 
1 , ϕ 1 is not executable at the ψ-state w ′ , contradicting the assumption that σ is strongly executable at all ψ-states. Therefore, we know that a 1 cannot be in the form of χ
Since a 1 is executable at each ψ-state, it follows by Proposition 10 that U(ψ → ψ 1 ) ∈ Γ . Since Khm(ψ 1 , ⊥, ϕ 1 ) ∈ Γ , it follows by ULKhm that Khm(ψ, ⊥, ϕ 1 ) ∈ Γ . By NECU and UMKhm, it is clear that Khm(ψ, χ, ϕ 1 ) ∈ Γ . -n ≥ 2. By induction on i, next we will show that Khm(ψ, χ, ϕ i ) ∈ Γ for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For the case of i = 1, with the similar proof as in the case of n = 1, we can show that a 1 can only be ψ 1 , ⊥, ϕ 1 and U(ψ → ψ 1 ) ∈ Γ . Therefore by UKhm we have Khm(ψ, χ, ϕ 1 ) ∈ Γ . Under the induction hypothesis (IH) that Khm(ψ, χ, ϕ i ) ∈ Γ for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we will show that Khm(ψ, χ, ϕ k+1 ) ∈ Γ , where 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1. Because σ is strongly executable at v, it follows that there are w ′ , v ′ ∈ S c such that
Moreover, for each t ′ with w
. It follows by Proposition 11 that U(ϕ k → χ) ∈ Γ ( ). Proceeding, there are two cases of a k+1 :
• a k+1 = ψ k+1 , ⊥, ϕ k+1 . Since σ is strongly executable at v, it follows that for each t ′ with w
It follows by the definition of
. Moreover, since a k is executable at w ′ , it follows by Proposition 11 that U(ϕ k → ψ k+1 ) ∈ Γ . Since a k+1 ∈ Σ Γ , it then follows that Khm(ψ k+1 , ⊥, ϕ k+1 ) ∈ Γ . It then follows by ULKhm that Khm(ϕ k , ⊥, ϕ k+1 ) ∈ Γ . Since ⊢ U(⊥ → χ), it follows by UMKhm that Khm(ϕ k , χ, ϕ k+1 ) ∈ Γ . Since by IH we have that Khm(ψ, χ, ϕ k ) ∈ Γ , It follows from ( ) and COMPKhm that Khm(ψ, χ, ϕ k+1 ) ∈ Γ .
• a k+1 = χ ψ k+1 k+1 , ϕ k+1 . Since σ is strongly executable at v, it follows that for each t ′ with w
k+1 for each t ′ with w
Note that the action a k cannot be in the form of χ
) where ⊢ χ 0 ↔ χ k+1 and χ 0 = χ k+1 . Since
Then it follows by the definition of transitions that w
k+1 , ϕ k+1 is not executable at v ′′ , contradicting the strong executability. Therefore, we know that a k cannot be in the form of χ
k+1 by definition of transitions. It follows that ψ k = ψ k+1 and ϕ k = χ k+1 . Since a k+1 ∈ Σ Γ , it follows that Khm(ψ k+1 , χ k+1 , ϕ k+1 ) ∈ Γ . Thus, we have Khm(ψ k , ϕ k , ϕ k+1 ) ∈ Γ . By ( ) and UMKhm we then have that Khm(ψ k , χ, ϕ k+1 ) ∈ Γ ( ). If k = 1, by Proposition 10 it is easy to show that U(ψ → ψ 1 ) ∈ Γ . Then by ULKhm we have Khm(ψ, χ, ϕ k+1 ) ∈ Γ . If k > 1, there is a state w ′′ such that
Since σ is strongly executable at v, it follows that for each t ′ with w
Conclusions
This paper generalizes the knowing how logic presented in [10] and proposes a ternary modal operator Khm(ψ, χ, ϕ) to express that the agent knows how to achieve ϕ given ψ while maintaining χ in-between. This paper also presents a sound and complete axiomatization of this logic. Compared to the completeness proof in [10] , the proof here is much more complicated, and the essential difference is that the state of the canonical model here is a pair consisting of a maximal consistent set and a marker of the form χ ψ which indicates that this state has a ψ, ⊥, χ -predecessor, in order to handle the intermediate constraints.
For future research, besides the obvious questions of decidability and model theory of the logic, we may give some alternative semantics to the same language by relaxing the strong executability. Intuitively, strongly executable plan may be too strong for knowledge-how in some cases. For example, if there is an action sequence σ in the agent's ability map such that doing σ at a ψ-state will always make the agent stop on ϕ states, we can probably also say the agent knows how to achieve ϕ given ψ, e.g., I know how to start the engine in that old car, just turn the key several times until it starts, and three times should suffice at most. Please note that there are two kinds of states on which the agent might stop: either states the agent achieves after doing σ successfully, or states on which the agent is unable to continue executing the remaining actions.
Another interesting topic is extending this logic with public announcement operators. Intuitively, [θ]ϕ says that ϕ holds after the information θ is provided. The update of the new information amounts to the change of the background knowledge throughout the model, and this will affect the knowledge-how. For example, a doctor may not know how to treat a patient with the disease p since he is worried that the only available medicine may potentially cause some very bad side-effect r, which can be expressed as ¬Khm(p, ¬r, ¬p). Suppose a new scientific discovery shows that the side-effect is not possible under the relevant circumstance, then the doctor should know how to treat the patient, which can be expresses as [¬r]Khm(p, ¬r, ¬p). 8 Moreover, we can consider contingent plans which involve conditions based on the knowledge of the agent. A contingent plan is a partial function on the agent's belief space. Such plans make more sense when the agent has the ability of observations during the execution of the plan. To consider contingent plan, we need to extend the model (ability map) with an epistemic relation. We then can express knowledge-that and knowledge-how at the same time, and discuss their interactions in one unified logical framework.
